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Abstract
Our work contributes to the literature relating output structure and economic deve-
lopment by showing that growth gains from upgrading are not unconditional. Relying
on data from a panel of Chinese cities, we show that the level of capabilities available to
domestic firms operating in ordinary trade is an important driver of economic growth.
However, no direct gains emanate from the complexity of goods produced by either
processing-trade activities or foreign firms. This suggests that the sources of product
upgrading matter, and that domestic embeddedness is key in order for capacity building
and technology adoption to be growth enhancing.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical work has put structural transformation back to the forefront of the un-
derstanding of economic growth (Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2011). Differences in countries’
ability to upgrade their production and diversify into complex goods appear to explain why
they take off or remain poor (McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). A by now well-established em-
pirical result is that countries specializing in more sophisticated goods subsequently grow
faster (Rodrik 2006; Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009).
This result has logically revived the question of which policy measures can help countries to
produce these higher productivity goods.
The attraction of FDI inflows has often been contemplated as one powerful tool to pro-
mote quality upgrades to the country product structure. The first channel is direct since the
quality of goods produced by foreign-invested firms is typically higher than those previously
exported by domestic firms in the host country (Wang and Wei, 2010; Iacovone and Javor-
cik, 2010).1 Second, the presence of multinationals may facilitate the product upgrading of
domestic firms through various spillovers. Similar theoretical arguments apply to the pro-
motion of processing trade, which involves the assembly of imported inputs into a final good
for export. Apart from the direct effect of producing more sophisticated goods, processing
trade may generate knowledge spillovers within firms2 and between firms. However there are
a number of factors which may undermine these potential technological spillovers in practice,
especially in the context of developing countries (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). Technology
1For a review of the research documenting the superior performance of foreign affiliates see Arnold and
Javorcik (2009).
2Firms can engage in both processing and ordinary trade activities simultaneously. Using Chinese customs
data for 2006, we compute that roughly 20% of firms operate in both trade sectors. The share is 30.5% for
foreign firms and 11.9% for domestic firms, respectively.
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diffusion and adoption may fail to come about due to limited domestic absorption capa-
city or in the absence of substantial and well-directed technological efforts by foreign and
domestic firms (Lall, 1992; Lall, 2001). An additional related impediment is that foreign
technologies may not be appropriate to the economic and social conditions of developing
countries (Basu and Weil, 1998). The available empirical literature on spillovers from FDI
reflects this theoretical ambiguity and finds mixed results (Go¨rg and Strobl, 2001; Blomstro¨m
and Kokko, 1998). The absence of the expected spillovers has important repercussions on
the sophistication-growth nexus: the apparent upgrading of a country’s exports could be a
statistical mirage. This could only reflect the advances of foreign firms or processed inputs
and not signal any enhanced capacity to produce (and export) more complex products by
domestic firms. In this case the growth benefits could be zero.
This paper argues that the sources of product upgrading matter and that domestic em-
beddedness is key for capacity building and technology adoption to be growth enhancing.
Our work contributes to the literature relating output structure and economic development
by showing that the growth gains from upgrading are not unconditional. Relying on data
from a panel of Chinese cities, we show that there are no direct gains from the complexity
of goods produced by either processing-trade activities or foreign firms. Our results are in
line with Jarreau and Poncet (2012) who find that the growth enhancement from export
sophistication is limited to the ordinary export activities undertaken by domestic firms. Our
approach is different in two respects: first, we depart from the cross-section analysis of city
performance and rely on panel data estimates which have the advantage of mitigating the
omitted-variables problem via fixed effects. We also rely on a series of robustness checks
to ensure that our results are not driven by measurement or endogeneity biases, including
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long difference in cross-section, first difference and GMM-system estimators. Second, up-
grading is measured using the newest Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) indicator of economic
complexity instead of Hausmann et al.’s (2007) measure of the income level of an export
basket. The economic complexity variable aims to capture the number and exclusivity of
locally-available capabilities. It is calculated using the method of reflections developed by
Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) so as to answer the criticism addressed to the circularity of
the Hausmann et al. (2007) measure of export sophistication (Felipe et al., 2012). The pro-
blem with export sophistication is that it is measured by comparison to the income level of
countries with similar export structures, mechanically leading to the circular conclusion that
“rich countries export rich-country products”. By contrast, Hidalgo and Hausmann’s (2009)
economic complexity measure separates information on income from that on the network
structure of countries and the products they export.
We compute economic complexity for a panel of over 200 Chinese cities and show that
it is a much more robust determinant of economic growth than is export sophistication.
When jointly included in a growth regression, export sophistication becomes insignificant
while economic complexity is positively and significantly associated with faster subsequent
GDP per capita growth. Our results hence confirm, in the context of a panel of cities within
one single country (China), Hidalgo and Hausmann’s (2009)3 prediction that locations with
productive structures geared towards complex products enjoy higher subsequent economic
growth. We do however show that the result pertains exclusively to the capabilities of firms
which are well-embedded in the local economy. As our data differentiate between processing
3According to Hidalgo and Hausmann’s theory of capabilities, a country’s capacity to grow resides in the
diversity of its available capabilities. Numerous and exclusive capabilities are required to move towards new
activities associated with higher productivity levels. A location’s level of capabilities can be inferred from
the complexity of the goods it exports.
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and ordinary trade separately for domestic and foreign-owned firms, we are able to compute
the growth benefits for those four respective categories of export upgrading. The research
here hence further contributes to the literature in two different ways.
We first add insights into the potential role of processing trade and FDI in development
strategies. These confirm existing results on the effectiveness of China’s FDI-reliant indus-
trial and trade strategy. For instance, Wang and Wei (2010) find that neither processing trade
nor foreign-invested firms can explain the increased overlap in the export structure between
China and high-income countries.4 Our result that economic complexity only boosts growth
if it is locally embedded is in line with the suggestion in Wang and Wei (2010) that the key to
China’s evolving export structure is human-capital accumulation and favorable government
policies such as tax-favored high-tech zones. This casts doubt on the capacity of China (as
well as developing countries in general) to successfully build up their own growth-enhancing
capabilities through technology acquisition via assembling activities and foreign investment.
Our message is thus consistent with the observation made by Fu et al. (2012) regarding
developing countries, that international technology diffusion does not unconditionally follow
from globalization and liberal trade regimes. As shown by Lall (2003), the expected gains via
technological transfers from FDI-based strategies do not materialize systematically. They
instead require a complex mix of indigenous innovation efforts and the presence of appro-
priate institutions and innovation systems. In the case of China, we interpret our results
as evidence that structural and geographical disconnections between ordinary activities and
those based on imported technology and foreign affiliates can impede technological diffusion.
4Harding and Javorcik (2012) reach a similar conclusion at the worldwide level: FDI does not seem to
increase the similarity of export structure between developing and developed countries.
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Similar arguments are brought up in the literature (Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2004; Hale
and Long, 2006; Bloningen and Ma, 2007) to explain the limited impact of assembly trade
on local production and the absence of FDI spillovers on the productivity of Chinese domes-
tic firms. Chinese authorities have adopted an “enclave” approach to internationalization,
confining foreign investment and processing activities to special economic zones dedicated
to export development. Our findings suggest that this deliberate choice, by limiting local
embeddedness, has reduced potential spillovers and hampered the emergence of growth gains
from processing and foreign activities.
Our results further contribute to the literature highlighting the specificity of processing
trade. Recent empirical evidence has emphasized, most often in the context of China, that
processing trade is a different activity from non-processing trade (Manova and Yu, 2012;
Dai et al., 2011).5 Our finding of a relationship between export upgrading and economic
growth which depends on whether capabilities are embedded in processing activities further
confirms that distinguishing between processing and ordinary exporters is crucial for our
understanding of trade performance and growth potential. This would also seem to confirm
the claims that processing trade systematically upwardly distorts the ‘true’ level of Chinese
export sophistication (Amiti and Freund, 2010; Yao, 2009; Van Assche and Gangnes, 2010).
Our results here suggest that the upgrading of ordinary export activities by domestic firms
is the key indicator of the genuine adoption of technology at the local level and to predict
benefits in terms of economic growth.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we set out
5Dai et al. (2011) find that processing trade involves unskilled labor-intensive jobs with low profitability
and produces low-quality goods.
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our measure of complexity and the datasets used. Section 3 then presents our empirical
approach, results and robustness checks. Last, Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and main variables
2.1 Product complexity
Following the literature on economic complexity (or sophistication), we calculate a location’s
complexity as a weighted average of the complexity of the products it exports. The weighting
reflects the relative importance of each product in the local export basket. The capacity
of a locality to export many complex products is considered to be indirect evidence of
the available local capabilities. The direct determination of intrinsic product features (the
technology embedded in it, the specialized skills required to produce it, R&D investments,
and so on) is difficult, especially at a very detailed level.6 Most indicators (Hausmann et
al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009) instead infer the complexity of the products from
observed worldwide trade patterns.
Hausmann et al. (2007) identify sophisticated goods as those requiring greater levels of
development to be exported.7 They capture the sophistication level (they call it “produc-
tivity”) of a good k by reference to the income level of the countries which export it. They
propose the indicator PRODYk which is the weighted average of the income levels of good
k’s exporters, where the weights correspond to the revealed comparative advantage of each
country j in good k:
6Lall (2000) proposes a classification of products by technological level, but at the relatively aggregated
3-digit SITC level.
7A very similar measure of product sophistication is developed by Lall et al. (2006).
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PRODYk =
∑
j
[
xjk/Xj∑
j xjk/Xj
]
× Yj (1)
Here xjk is the value of exports of good k by country j, Xj the total value of country j’s
exports, and Yj the per capita income of country j, measured as the real GDP per capita
in PPP. The greater is the weight of good k in the exports of rich countries, the higher is
its PRODY , the more sophisticated it is considered to be. This indicator’s use of income
information has been criticized as it gives rise to a circularity issue that “rich countries
export rich-country products” (Hidalgo, 2009).
Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) address this problem by proposing a complexity indicator
that is based solely on information on the network structure of countries and the products
they export. They argue that a complex product is one that requires many or exclusive
capabilities. This exclusivity of the set of capabilities used by a product can then be inferred
from its ubiquity and from the diversity of the export basket of the countries that export it.
Complex products are expected to be exported by fewer countries with revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) (i.e. they are less ubiquitous) and by countries with many and diverse
capabilities.8
Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) develop the method of reflections that consists in calcu-
lating jointly and iteratively the ubiquity and the diversity indicators to introduce in the
product complexity measure as much information as possible from the network structure of
countries and products.
8Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) use Lego models as an analogy. Lego pieces are held to represent the
capabilities available across the world, while Lego models correspond to the different products and Lego
buckets represent countries. Complex Lego models (products) are those using Lego pieces (capabilities) that
are rare, so that they are likely to be found in only few Lego buckets (countries) and especially in those that
have both many and rare Lego pieces.
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Ubiquity and diversity are computed as follows:
UBIQUITYk = Kk,0 =
∑
j
Mjk (2)
DIV ERSITYj = Kj,0 =
∑
k
Mjk (3)
where j denotes the country, k the product, and Mj,k is equal to 1 if country j exports
product k with revealed comparative advantage and 0 otherwise.9 The index of revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) is defined following Balassa (1964) as the ratio of the export
share of a given product in the country’s export basket to the same share at the worldwide
level:
RCAjk =
xjk/Xj∑
j(xjk/Xj)
(4)
Product complexity for good k is hence computed after n iterations as the following
weighted average:
Kk,n =
1
Kk,0
∑
j
Mjk Kj,n−1 (5)
where Kj,n−1 is economic complexity defined at the country-j level:
Kj,n−1 =
1
Kj,0
∑
k
Mjk Kk,n−2 (6)
To clarify the logic behind the iterations, consider the benefits of moving from Kk,0
9We consider, following Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), that a country j has a revealed comparative
advantage in a product k if RCA > 1. In robustness checks we show that our results continue to hold if we
use 1.5 or 2 as alternative thresholds.
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(ubiquity) to Kk,1 to evaluate the complexity of good k. Compared to Kk,0, Kk,1 shows that
a complex good is not only characterized by a low level of ubiquity (Kk,0) but also by being
exported by complex countries (i.e. those with high diversity), it hence corresponds to the
average diversity10 of the countries that export k with RCA, which is computed as:
Kk,1 =
1
Kk,0
∑
j
Mjk Kj,0 (7)
Similarly the complexity of a country should not only be viewed as related to diversity but
should also reflect the degree of ubiquity of the products that it exports, which corresponds
to:
Kj,1 =
1
Kj,0
∑
k
Mjk Kk,0 (8)
Additional information regarding the complexity of the product k can hence be extracted
from an additional iteration, i.e. Kk,2, which is the average Kj,1 of countries exporting k
with RCA. This corresponds to the average ubiquity of the products exported with RCA
by countries exporting product k with RCA. The same logic applies to the iterations of the
measure of country-level complexity. The indicator Kj,2 refines the evaluation of country-
level complexity compared to Kj,1 by computing the average diversity of countries with
similar export baskets to country j.
Equation (5) is iterated until no additional information can be derived from the previous
iteration, that is when the relative rankings of the values estimated using (5) in the n+ 1th
and nth iterations are the same.11
10Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) find the stylized fact that more developed countries are also those who
have a higher level of diversity. This is consistent with the expectation that diversity reflects the multiplicity
of capabilities (technology, labor skills, institutions, inputs, etc) required to produce different products.
11See Felipe et al. (2012) for an extensive presentation of the product and country complexity measures
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We compute product complexity for 5017 products using the BACI world trade dataset.
This covers trade at the 6-digit product level for 230 countries.12 Our product complexity
measure corresponds to the 15th iteration, Kk,15, for 1997, the first year of our panel. Using
a time-invariant measure of product complexity reduces the likelihood of bias in the index
as it ensures that our measure of the capability requirements of products is not affected
by economic changes over time, such as the rise of China in international trade or other
evolutions in the world-trade structure. However, as a robustness check, we will ensure that
our results continue to hold when we use a time-varying measure.
2.2 City complexity
We compute economic complexity for over 200 cities in China: this is the average complexity
of the goods that the city exports with revealed comparative advantage.
Using the above notation from Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) and indexing cities by c,
we calculate the city complexity index Kc as:
Kc =
1
Kc,0
∑
k
Mc,k Kk,15 (9)
where Mc,k is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if city c has a comparative advantage in
the good k, Kc,0 is the number of products for which city c has a comparative advantage,
and Kk,15 is product-level complexity as defined above. We use Chinese customs data over
and a discussion of the product and country rankings.
12This dataset is constructed based on COMTRADE data using an original procedure that reconciles
the declarations of exporters and importers (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010). The harmonization procedure
enables the number of countries for which trade data are available to be extended considerably, as com-
pared to the original dataset. This uses the 1992 product nomenclature. BACI is downloadable from
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm.
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the 1997-2007 period, which report exports by 6-digit product.13 One feature of interest
in this dataset is that it separates trade flows depending on the ownership type of the
exporter (foreign or domestic) and the trade regime. This allows us notably to investigate
the specificity of processing trade. It is officially defined as “business activities in which
the operating enterprise imports all or part of the raw or ancillary materials, spare parts,
components, and packaging materials, and re-exports finished products after processing or
assembling these materials/parts”.14
Following Hausmann et al. (2011), we use the standardized version of our indicator to
consider the link between complexity and economic growth. For a given city c and year t,
complexity is calculated as the value of Ktc minus the yearly average across the n Chinese
cities in our sample,15 all divided by the yearly standard deviation.16
Complexitytc =
Ktc −
∑
cK
t
c/n
σKtc
(10)
Figure 1 provides a visual summary of the relationship between GDP per capita growth
and complexity in Chinese cities. We use data on GDP per capita growth between 1997
and 2009 split into three 4-year sub-periods after controlling for the log of initial GDP per
capita, year fixed effects and city fixed effects.
We contrast the results in panel (a) obtained using our indicator a` la Hausmann et al.
13Chinese Customs data are reported using an 8-digit classification. We convert these into the 1992
Harmonized system (HS) classification to match the 1992 classification used in the BACI dataset.
14This definition is provided in “Measures of the Customs of the People’s Republic of China on the Control
of Processing-Trade Goods” released in 2004 (Manova and Yu, 2012).
15Our sample includes 221 cities. This number corresponds to the cities for which we have consistent
information both on trade flows and macro-level determinants such as GDP and population.
16The standard deviation is computed yearly as σKtc =
√∑
c(K
t
c)
2
n −
(∑
cK
t
c
n
)2
.
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Figure 1: Complexity and GDP per capita growth across Chinese cities
(a) Complexity
(b) Export sophistication
Note: Chinese prefecture complexity or sophistication and GDP per capita growth between
1997 and 2009 (3× 4-year sub-periods) after controlling for Ln initial GDP per capita, year
fixed effects and city fixed effects.
13
Figure 2: Four components of complexity and GDP per capita growth across Chinese cities
(a) Domestic ordinary (b) Domestic processing
(c) Foreign ordinary (d) Foreign processing
Note: Chinese prefecture complexity and GDP per capita growth between 1997 and 2009
(3× 4-year sub-periods) after controlling for Ln initial GDP per capita, year fixed effects
and city fixed effects.
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(2011) to those based on the export-sophistication indicator proposed by Hausmann et al.
(2007), reported in panel (b).
We find for both indicators the expected positive and significant relationship between
upgrading and economic growth. The correlation appears to be stronger for the Hausmann
et al. (2011) complexity indicator as indicated by the steeper slope and a smaller standard
error.
Figure 2 decomposes complexity into its four components depending on firm-ownership
type (domestic or foreign) and trade regime (domestic or processing). The components are
calculated from on Equation (9) using the specific export baskets of domestic and foreign
firms under the processing and ordinary trade regimes. There is a clear positive relationship
between complexity and GDP per capita growth in Panel (a) for domestic firms engaged
in ordinary trade. The relationship is insignificant in the other panels, providing some
preliminary evidence that the source of complexity is important for upgrading to be growth-
enhancing.
Macro-level data at the city level, including GDP, population and traditional determi-
nants of growth such as investment, human capital or FDI, are taken from China Data
Online, provided by the University of Michigan. Combining the customs and macro-level
data, we end up with a sample of 221 cities for which we have consistent data on GDP
per capita and export structure between 1997 and 2009. The list of these cities appears in
Appendix Table 8. The summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 9 and
their pairwise correlations appear in Table 10.
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3 Empirical estimation
3.1 Baseline specification
We would like to establish the empirical link between initial complexity and subsequent
GDP per capita growth in Chinese cities, controlling for initial income and the traditional
determinants of economic growth (Barro, 1991). Our baseline specification comes from a
fixed-effect estimation using our city-level panel data, of the following form:
Yc,t+4 − Yc,t
4
= α0 + α1Yc,t + β Complexityc,t + γ1InvRatec,t + γ2HumCapc,t
+ γ3Opennessc,t + γ4FDIc,t + ηc + µt + c (11)
where Y denotes log GDP per capita and c is the index of our 221 cities. In Table 1, we
estimate this model for three 4-year sub-periods starting in 1997 (1997-2000, 2001-04 and
2005-09). The Complexity variable proxies for the number and exclusivity of capabilities in
the city, as discussed in Section 2. The logarithm of initial GDP per capita is included to con-
trol for convergence across cities. The ratio of investment in fixed assets to GDP (InvRate)
is a proxy for the rate of physical capital accumulation, and the share of population enrolled
in secondary schooling to control for human capital in the city’s labor force (HumCap). We
also include the openness rate (imports plus exports over GDP) and FDI inflows over GDP
in the city, as suggested by Berthe´lemy and De´murger (2000) in the Chinese context. Last,
the regressions contain both city and time dummies, denoted by ηc and µt respectively. The
econometric issues resulting from the use of fixed effects in a growth model with a lagged
16
dependent variable are explored in the next subsection. This will discuss various robustness
checks, including a long difference (1997-2009) in GDP per capita growth as in Hausmann
et al. (2007) and the use of first-difference and GMM system estimators.
Our departure point in column 1 of Table 1 appeals to export sophistication from Haus-
mann et al. (2007) as a proxy for complexity. This hence corresponds to the panel equivalent
of the cross-section results in Jarreau and Poncet (2012). The coefficient on export sophisti-
cation is positive as expected, but significant at the 10% confidence level only. This estimated
coefficient becomes insignificant when we use our preferred complexity indicator in column
2. The indicator of complexity in Hausmann et al. (2011) is however significant at the 1%
confidence level and is robust to the inclusion of numerous controls, as shown in columns 3
to 7 of Table 1. We interpret this result as showing the greater capacity of the complexity
indicator to capture the time-varying level and diversity of capabilities across Chinese cities.
The coefficients on the control variables are as expected. Initial GDP per capita enters
with a negative and significant coefficient, indicating convergence across Chinese cities. Our
measure of physical-capital accumulation enters positively and significantly, while that on
human capital is insignificant. As expected, the openness rate and FDI over GDP have
positive effects, but with only the former being significant.
The remaining columns in Table 1 check that the impact of our key complexity indi-
cator is robust to the inclusion of the control variables commonly used in the literature
to account for an economy’s productive structure. Column 3 introduces a measure of ex-
port diversification, the Theil index,17 which is typically used to analyze the evolution of
17For each city and year we compute Theil = 1n
∑n
k=1
xk
µ ln
(
xk
µ
)
, where µ = 1n
n∑
k=1
xk, xk denotes the
exports of good k and n is the number of exported goods. The negative sign is expected as an increase in
the Theil index reflects less diversification (Cadot et al., 2011).
17
export-diversification patterns with economic development. In line with the existing litera-
ture (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003; Cadot et al., 2011), the Theil index enters with a negative
sign, suggesting that diversification rises with economic growth in China. This coefficient is
however insignificant and does not affect that on complexity. In column 4, we add the share
of natural-resource exports over GDP, since we may worry that complexity is capturing the
effect of intrinsically low-ubiquity natural-resource products. Natural-resource exports are
identified using the classification in Sachs and Warner (1999). This variable enters with a
positive but insignificant coefficient, while the impact of complexity remains unchanged. In
column 5, we control for the contribution of both manufacturing and services to city GDP.
We find a negative but marginally significant effect of the share of the secondary sector and
an insignificant impact of the share of the tertiary sector. However, the coefficient on the
complexity indicator is again unchanged. In column 6, we replace the openness ratio by the
export rate, and in column 7 we control for population size. Neither of these variables signi-
ficantly affects economic growth. Overall our results support those in Hidalgo and Hausmann
(2009), in that regions specializing in more complex goods subsequently grow faster.
Across the various specifications, the point estimate on complexity is stable at 0.007,
significant at the 1% significance level. As our estimated coefficient is a semi-elasticity, we
calculate that a one standard deviation increase in complexity increases the annual growth
rate by 0.7 percentage points. This is a clearly economically-significant impact.
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Table 1: Within regressions (city): economic complexity and GDP per capita growth between
1997 and 2009 (3× 4-year sub-periods)
Dependent variable : City yearly GDP per capita growth 1997-2009, (3× 4-year sub-periods)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Initial GDP per capita -0.146a -0.144a -0.144a -0.140a -0.136a -0.144a -0.144a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Export sophistication 0.015c 0.012
(0.008) (0.007)
Complexity 0.006a 0.007a 0.007a 0.007a 0.007a 0.007a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Investment Rate 0.011b 0.012b 0.012b 0.011b 0.014a 0.012a 0.011b
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Human Capital -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Openness rate 0.006 0.007c 0.007c 0.004 0.007b 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
FDI rate 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Theil index -0.003
(0.003)
Nat. Resource Exports 0.004
over GDP (0.002)
Secondary GDP share -0.031c
(0.018)
Tertiary GDP share 0.001
(0.020)
Exports over GDP 0.003
(0.004)
Population -0.013
(0.024)
Fixed effects City fixed effects and year fixed effects
Observations 623 623 623 623 623 623 623
R-squared 0.758 0.761 0.760 0.762 0.762 0.758 0.760
Number of Cities 221 221 221 221 221 221 221
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; standard errors
are clustered at the city level; a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
confidence levels; all variables are in logs, except for complexity and the Theil index.
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3.2 Robustness checks
Tables 2 and 3 contain further robustness checks. In Table 2 we verify that our findings
are not driven by the way in which we define revealed comparative advantage to calculate
complexity and by outliers. In Table 3 we rely on alternative estimation strategies to take
potential endogeneity into account.
As in Equation (9), our complexity indicator reflects only products which are exported
with revealed comparative advantage (RCA). In this formula, only goods for which Mck = 1
contribute to the complexity of city c. We should thus check that our results are not sensitive
to the threshold used to measure RCAs. In column 1 of Table 2, we consider that location
j has an RCA in product k when RCAjk, as defined in Equation (4), is strictly greater
than 1.5, instead of 1 as in our baseline specification. The results in column 3 use an even
stricter criterion of RCA > 2. Neither of these changes has any impact on the results. In
columns 3 and 5 we consider specific city features, and check that our results hold when
removing locations that are known to be clearly different from others, in terms of location
and policy particularities which have made them richer, faster-growing, more open, and
more likely to export complex goods. In column 3, we estimate our model excluding the four
cities with province status (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing), which stand out for
their greater political autonomy and smaller surface area. Our main result is robust to this
exclusion. In column 4 we exclude the 53 cities with special policy zones from Wang and
Wei (2010). These zones were created by the government, starting in 1979 in Guangdong,
in order to promote industrial activity, innovation and exports.
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They offer lower taxes and faster administrative procedures in order to favor industrial
clustering. Despite the sharp reduction in the number of observations, the effect of complex-
ity on GDP per capita growth is unaffected. We further check that the effect of complexity
is not confined to cities with more exports and estimate, in column 5, our model without the
top decile of exporting cities: our estimates are again virtually unchanged. In the remaining
columns of Table 2, we exclude the top and bottom 3 cities according to different criteria
from our sample to test if extreme values affect our results. In column 6 the criterion is the
level of GDP, in column 7 growth performance, in column 8 complexity, and in column 9
openness. Our results seem robust to these exclusions and are thus not driven by extreme
values in those key dimensions.
Table 3 considers alternative estimation techniques which take endogeneity and measure-
ment issues into account. Column 1 shows the baseline results in which city complexity is
computed using the time-invariant product-level. As discussed in Section 2, our product-
complexity indicator (defined in Equation 5) is calculated for 1997, the first year of our
sample. In column 2 of Table 3 we instead use a year-specific product complexity measure,
which does not change our results. In the remaining columns of Table 3 we depart from the
fixed-effect model. As emphasized by Nickell (1981), the autoregressive parameter is likely
downward biased as the introduction of the lagged dependent variable together with city
fixed effects renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent. Two different strategies are
then used to remove the individual time-invariant component.
In column 3, our results are estimated using a long difference in per capita GDP growth
on initial complexity between 1997 and 2009. In column 4, we use first differences instead of
fixed effects. Despite the sharp decline in the number of observations, the results are virtually
22
unchanged. Finally, in column 5 we address the issue of endogeneity. We estimate our model
using the system-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998). We follow Roodman (2006) and use only two lags for the lagged dependent
variable and one and two lags for the other (predetermined) variables. As suggested by
Roodman (2006), the number of instruments, shown at the foot of the column is considerably
below the number of groups present in our estimations.
Table 3: Alternative estimation methods: complexity and GDP per capita growth
Dependent Variable City yearly GDP per capita growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time-variant Long difference First System
Benchmark Kk,15 1997-2009 Difference GMM
Initial GDP per capita -0.143a -0.144a -0.003 -0.197a -0.087a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.014) (0.016)
Complexity 0.007a 0.005b 0.004b 0.008a 0.018a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Investment Rate 0.012b 0.012b 0.005 0.003 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Human Capital -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.013
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.021)
Openness rate 0.007c 0.007c 0.002 0.010a 0.035a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008)
FDI rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
City fixed effects yes yes no yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes no yes yes
Observations 623 623 184 400 623
R-squared 0.760 0.758 0.069 0.598
Number of cities 221 221 184 219 221
Number of instruments 19
Hansen Test 12.21
p-value 0.342
AR(1) -2.89
p-value 0.004
Notes: GDP per capita growth is calculated for three 4-year sub-periods in all columns apart
from column 3; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard errors are
clustered at the city level; a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels;
all variables are in logs, except for complexity and the Theil index.
The consistency of the GMM estimates depends on instrument validity. The Hansen test
of overidentifying restrictions indicates that the orthogonality conditions cannot be rejected
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at the ten percent level. We thus do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
appropriate. The strong link between complexity and growth does not appear to be driven
by simultaneity bias.
3.3 Domestic embeddedness as a prerequisite
Our results so far have confirmed, in the context of Chinese cities, the cross-country evidence
that specialization in complex products is beneficial, in growth terms. This evidence however
has not accounted for the huge heterogeneity in trade regimes and firm types that exists in
Chinese exports. They also do not allow us to conclude whether the FDI- and processing
trade-strategy in China was successful in boosting growth. Disentangling between the various
sources of complexity is hence key for us to be able to conclude as to the capacity of FDI
inflows and processing trade to produce the expected growth-enhancing quality upgrades to
a country’s product structure. Doing so furthermore allows us to see whether, as suggested
in the literature, the positive growth externalities from complex exports are conditional on
the trade regime. Jarreau and Poncet (2012) and Wei and Wang (2010) find no association
between processing activities, on the one hand, and growth and sophistication, on the other.
A similar lack of correlation is found in the case of foreign-firm export activities. These
results suggest that the complexity associated with processing (foreign dominated) export
activities may not produce any growth gains, as this does not reflect the characteristics of
local production, but rather imported inputs. This is an important question, since China’s
trade patterns are greatly influenced by the presence of foreign companies and processing
trade. For example, in 2007, 54% of Chinese exports were in the processing-trade sector.
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Table 4 disentangles the roles of trade regime and firm type in the complexity-growth
relationship. In columns 1 and 2, we introduce the complexity of a city’s exports calculated
only using data on domestic and foreign firms, respectively. In the first column, based on
domestic firms’ export baskets, complexity attracts a positive and significant coefficient,
of the same size as previously. By way of contrast, when complexity is based on foreign
firms it is insignificant. In the following four columns (3 to 6), complexity is split into
its four components of processing and ordinary trade, separately for domestic and foreign
entities. The correlation with subsequent economic growth is positive and significant only
in column 3, where complexity is measured based on ordinary export activities undertaken
by domestic firms. In column 7 we simultaneously include the four components: again, only
the complexity associated with the ordinary export activities of domestic firms is positive
and significant. The other three components seem to yield no direct growth gains. Our
results are in line with the finding in Jarreau and Poncet (2012) based on sophistication,
and suggest that the upgrading-growth relationship pertains exclusively to the capabilities
of firms which are well-embedded in the local economy.
Our results hold in the various robustness checks carried out above with the aggregate
complexity measure in Tables (1) to (3). Tables (5) to (7) in the appendix check that
our results hold when we add various control variables, remove outliers and adopt different
estimation approaches. We consistently find that the positive and significant association
between complexity and subsequent economic growth is limited to the ordinary export ac-
tivities undertaken by domestic firms: no direct gains result from either processing trade
activities or foreign firms.
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We interpret our results as indicating that domestic embeddedness is crucial for capa-
city building and technology adoption to be growth-enhancing and that in the context of
China, these conditions are not met for the diffusion of technology incorporated in assembly
activities. This may be related to the “enclave” approach to internationalization adopted
by Chinese authorities, confining foreign investment and processing activities to special eco-
nomic zones dedicated to export development. This strategy may have limited the local
embeddedness of the capacities deployed by foreign entities, and hampered the emergence
of the expected growth gains from their activities.
There may be additional impeding factors in China explaining why complexity affects
growth only when it corresponds to the capabilities truly embedded in the local economy.
For example, potential technological spillovers may be hampered by limited domestic ab-
sorption capacity or the absence of substantial and well-directed technological efforts by
foreign and domestic firms (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). The empirical results in Li (2011)
on the complementarity between in-house and imported technology are consistent with this
argument. Li shows that importing foreign technology alone does not facilitate innovation
in Chinese state-owned high-tech enterprises unless in-house R&D is also carried out. He
also finds that firms have less difficulty in absorbing domestic technological knowledge than
in utilizing foreign technology, which is consistent with our claim that the benefits from
upgrading are contingent on the source of external knowledge.
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4 Conclusion
We here confirm the specificity of the upgrading-growth relationship, appealing to regional
variation within one country (China) over the 1997-2009 period using the new indicator of
complexity of Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). Our results confirm the stylized fact in cross-
country regressions that regions specializing in more complex goods subsequently grow faster.
They however underline that the sources of product upgrading matter, and that domestic
embeddedness is key for capacity building and technology adoption to be growth enhancing.
Growth benefits pertain exclusively to the capabilities of domestic firms engaged in ordinary
trade, and no direct gains emanate from the complexity of goods produced by either pro-
cessing trade activities or foreign firms. Our findings cast doubt on the capacity of China (as
well as developing countries in general) to successfully build up their own growth-enhancing
capabilities via technology acquisition from assembling activities and foreign investment.
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Appendix
Table 5: Robustness checks (additional controls): complexity components and GDP per
capita growth
Dependent Variable City GDP per capita growth 1997-2009, (3× 4-year sub-periods)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Initial GDP per capita -0.144a -0.140a -0.137a -0.144a -0.144a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Complexity - Domestic Ordinary 0.006b 0.006b 0.006b 0.006b 0.006b
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Complexity - Domestic Processing -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Complexity - Foreign Ordinary 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Complexity - Foreign Processing -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Investment Rate 0.012a 0.012a 0.014a 0.013a 0.012a
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Human Capital 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Openness rate 0.007b 0.004 0.008b 0.007c
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
FDI rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Theil index -0.004
(0.003)
Nat. Resource Exports 0.004c
(0.002)
Secondary share -0.032c
(0.018)
Tertiary share -0.003
(0.020)
Exports over GDP 0.005
(0.003)
Population -0.010
(0.025)
Fixed effects City fixed effects and year fixed effects
Observations 623 623 623 623 623
R-squared 0.761 0.763 0.762 0.758 0.760
Number of cities 221 221 221 221 221
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; standard errors are
clustered at the city level; a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels;
all of our variables are in logs, except for the complexity measures and the Theil index.
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Table 7: Alternative estimation methods: complexity components and GDP per capita
growth
Dependent Variable Average GDP per capita growth for each period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benchmark Yearly Kk,15 Long cross section First-Diff System-GMM
Initial GDP per capita -0.143a -0.144a -0.004 -0.198a -0.101a
(0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.014) (0.019)
Complexity Domestic Ordinary 0.006b 0.004b 0.006b 0.006b 0.010b
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Complexity Domestic Processing -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Complexity Foreign Ordinary 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Complexity Foreign Processing -0.001 -0.001 -0.004b -0.001 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Investment Rate 0.012a 0.012a 0.007c 0.003 -0.010
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Human Capital -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.024
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.017)
Openness rate 0.007c 0.007c 0.002 0.010a 0.038a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008)
FDI rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
City fixed effects yes yes no yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes no yes yes
Observations 623 623 184 400 623
R-squared 0.760 0.758 0.112 0.597
Number of cities 221 221 219 221
Number of instruments 28
Hansen Test 20.55
p-value 0.196
AR(1) -2.42
p-value 0.016
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the
city level; a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence levels; all of our variables are in logs,
except for the complexity measures.
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Table 8: City list by Province
Province name Ciy name
Anhui Anqing, Bengbu, Chaohu, Chizhou, Fuyang, Hefei, Huaibei, Huainan, Huangshan
Liuan, Maanshan, Tongling, Wuhu, Xuancheng
Beijing Beijing
Chongqing Chongqing
Fujian Fuzhou, Longyan, Nanping, Ningde, Putian, Quanzhou, Sanming, Xiamen, Zhangzhou
Gansu Baiyin, Lanzhou, Tianshui
Guangdong Chaozhou, Foshan, Guangzhou, Heyuan, Huizhou, Jiangmen, Jieyang, Maoming, Meizhou
Shantou, Shanwei, Shaoguan, Shenzhen, Yangjiang, Zhanjiang, Zhongshan, Zhuhai
Guangxi Beihai, Guilin, Qinzhou, Yulin
Guizhou Guiyang, Liupanshui, Zunyi
Hebei Baoding, Cangzhou, Chengde, Handan, Hengshui, Langfang, Qinhuangdao, Shijiazhuang
Tangshan, Xingtai, Zhangjiakou
Heilongjiang Daqing, Harbin, Hegang, Heihe, Jiamusi, Jixi, Mudanjiang, Qiqihar, Qitaihe
Shuangyashan, Suihua
Henan Anyang, Hebi, Jiaozuo, Kaifeng, Luohe, Luoyang, Nanyang, Puyang, Sanmenxia, Shangqiu
Xinxiang, Xinyang, Xuchang, Zhengzhou, Zhoukou, Zhumadian
Hubei Ezhou, Huanggang, Huangshi, Jingmen, Jingzhou, Shiyan, Suizhou, Wuhan, Xiangfan
Xianning, Xiaogan, Yichang
Hunan Changde, Changsha, Chenzhou, Hengyang, Huaihua, Loudi, Shaoyang, Xiangtan, Yiyang
Yueyang, Zhuzhou
Inner Mongolia Baotou, Chifeng, Hulunbeir, Wuhai
Jiangsu Changzhou, Huaian, Lianyungang, Nanjing, Nantong, Suqian, Suzhou, Taizhou, Wuxi
Xuzhou, Yancheng, Yangzhou, Zhenjiang
Jiangxi Fuzhou, Ganzhou, Jian, Jingdezhen, Jiujiang, Nanchang, Pingxiang, Shangrao
Xinyu, Yichun, Yingtan
Jilin Changchun, Jilin, Siping, Tonghua
Liaoning Anshan, Benxi, Dalian, Dandong, Fushun, Fuxin, Jinzhou, Liaoyang, Panjin, Shenyang
Tieling, Yingkou
Ningxia Yinchuan
Shaanxi Ankang, Baoji, Tongchuan, Weinan, Xian, Xianyang, Yulin
Shandong Dezhou, Dongying, Heze, Jinan, Jining, Laiwu, Liaocheng, Linyi, Qingdao, Rizhao, Taian
Weifang, Weihai, Yantai, Zibo
Shanghai Shanghai
Shanxi Changzhi, Datong, Jincheng, Jinzhong, Linfen, Taiyuan, Xinzhou, Yangquan, Yuncheng
Sichuan Chengdu, Deyang, Guangan, Guangyuan, Leshan, Luzhou, Mianyang, Nanchong, Neijiang
Panzhihua, Suining, Yaan, Yibin, Zigong
Tianjin Tianjin
Xinjiang Urumqi
Yunnan Baoshan, Kunming, Qujing, Yuxi, Zhaotong
Zhejiang Hangzhou, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Jinhua, Lishui, Ningbo, Quzhou, Shaoxing, Wenzhou, Zhoushan
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Table 9: Summary statistics No. of observations=623
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Average yearly GDP per capita growth (1997-2009) 0.11 0.05 -0.10 0.34
GDP per capita (yuan) 12,550 16,323 1,880 272,132
Complexity 0 0.99 -2.87 3.36
Complexity Dom-ODT 0 1 -3.10 5.42
Complexity Dom-PCS 0 1 -3.58 4.15
Complexity For-ODT 0 1 -3.31 4.52
Complexity For-PCS 0 1 -2.9 4.22
Export sophistication ($) 10947.2 2452.10 539.75 19687.4
Investment Rate 0.31 0.14 0.05 0.83
Human Capital 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.13
Openness Rate 0.02 0.04 0 0.38
FDI rate 55.12 79.77 0.02 681.03
Theil 4.98 1.29 2.05 8.33
Natural Resource Exp. over GDP 0.002 0.004 0 0.03
Secondary GDP Share 0.45 0.10 0.15 0.88
Tertiary GDP Share 0.35 0.07 0.09 0.68
Exports over GDP 0.01 0.02 0 0.21
Population (thousands) 4,468 3,074 406 31,692
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